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It is common to assimilate Marx’s and Spinoza’s conceptions of democracy.2 Indeed, Marx 
appears to have drawn his idea of “true democracy” (contrasted to democracy as a mere state-
form) fairly directly from his study of Spinoza.3 In this paper, I address Marx’s relation to 
Spinoza both at the level of historical influence and at the level of theoretical affinity.4 I grant 
the historical influence: Marx’s notebooks reveal that he does locate key theoretical elements 
for his early theory of democracy in Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise or TTP. 
However, at the theoretical level, I argue that a sharp distinction must be drawn between 
 
1 This research was supported by Yale-NUS College (through grant number IG17-SR101). I am grateful for 
helpful criticisms from Bernardo Bianchi, Tom Davies, Bjorn Gomes, and Jason Yonover. 
2 I abbreviate the titles of primary texts by Spinoza, Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx when citing their works. For 
Spinoza, E=Ethics; TTP=Theological-Political Treatise; TP=Political Treatise, all cited according to volume 
norms of the Latin Gebhardt edition and Curley’s English translation. For Rousseau, SC=The Social Contract. 
For Hegel, PR=Elements of the Philosophy of Right. For Marx, MTTP=1841 notebooks on Spinoza (Marx 
1977); MSC=1843 notebook on Rousseau's Social Contract (Marx 1981); CHPR=Critique of Hegel's 
“Philosophy of Right”; CWF=The Civil War in France. 
3 Abensour (2011: 51); Chrysis (2018: 37-41, 74-75); Dobbs-Weinstein (2014); Igoin (1977); Negri (1998: 
246n21); Rubel (1962); Sharp (2013). All these (save Sharp) explicitly highlight the link between MTTP and 
CHPR. 
The present chapter builds upon the papers of Matheron (1977) and Morfino (2013), who both sketch an 
ambivalent picture of the connection between Marx and Spinoza on the question of democracy.  
Yovel (1989: 78-103) offers a rare total rejection of a similarity between Spinoza and Marx on the question of 
democracy. 
4 A third possible methodological approach would be theoretical transformation. Seeking to shed Marx's 
Hegelian baggage of teleology and transcendental subjectivism, French philosophers of the late 20th century 
attempted to refound Marxism on a Spinozist metaphysical basis. See Althusser (1976) for a classic statement; 
and Holland (1998) for an overview. Some authors have attempted more specifically to transform Marx's 
conception of democracy in a Spinozist direction. For example, see Lordon (2014: 147-60) and Holland (1998: 
§24, §26). Such efforts sometimes retain what I'll identify as an unSpinozist element: a blanket opposition to 
institutional mediation, rather than a Spinozist ambivalence.  
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Marxian and Spinozist democracy. Philosophically, Spinoza’s commitment to understanding 
politics through real concrete powers rather than abstract juridical rights is incompatible with 
Marx’s anti-institutional conception of true democracy. And as a matter of social theory, the 
gap between civil society and the state which so troubles Marx is a development of modernity 
that has not entered Spinoza's premodern field of view. Marx’s own notebooks suggest his 
notion of true democracy was also influenced by Rousseau; indeed, I argue that true 
democracy finds in Rousseau a theoretical forebear just as close if not closer than Spinoza. 
 
In this chapter, I will proceed as follows. First, I will sketch Marx's theory of democracy as it 
appears in his early CHPR (1843).5 Second, I will sketch the Spinozist corroborations for this 
theory of democracy, as they appear in Marx's 1841 student notebook transcriptions of the 
TTP. Third, I will articulate a systematic understanding of Spinoza's political philosophy, 
drawing not only on the TTP, but also the Political Treatise or TP, and the Ethics or E. I will 
indicate the mismatch between the Spinozist theory of democracy emergent from this 
systematic understanding and the Marxist view. Fourth and finally, I will consider true 
democracy from the point of view of social theory, indicating a Rousseauvian influence and 
theoretical affinity at odds with Spinoza’s premodern understanding. 
 
Marx's vision of democracy 
I distinguish the three key elements of Marx's early theory of democracy, as it develops in the 
CHPR, as follows. They are: 
1. An identification of democracy, not monarchy, as the truth of all regimes; 
2. A hostility to the state, insofar as it outstrips the “actual human lives” of its subjects, 
and correspondingly a valorization of a “true democracy” which involves the 
dissolution of the state; 
3. And an affinity between a democratic social order and an irreligious social order. 
However, I will not present these elements as freestanding theses. Marx's theory of 
democracy emerges within his section-by-section commentary on Hegel's PR §§261-313, and 
it takes shape as a fairly direct transformation of Hegelian theoretical structures.6 It is within 
these structures that we can understand the meaning and theoretical stakes of Marx's 
characterization of certain social orders as true and not abstract or alienated. Thus, I will start 
by sketching the broad frame of Hegel's political philosophy: his notion of freedom and its 
connection to rationality and politics. Then, I will present Hegel's views on the rational 
modern state, including its distinction between public and private domains, and its properly 
monarchical form. These very same elements, defended by Hegel as a solution to abstraction, 
are, for Marx, the central manifestations of modern alienation which true democracy 
promises to overcome. 
 
Hegel frames the overall purpose and outlook of his Philosophy of Right as follows: 
This treatise [...] in so far as it deals with political science, shall be nothing other than 
an attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity. (PR 
Pref | 21) 
 
5 In this chapter, I address only Marx's early views. I focus on the CHPR because it is the discussion of 
democracy most chronologically proximate to Marx's 1841 Spinoza notebook (MTTP). 
Did Marx in his later works come to repudiate democracy as a mere bourgeois ideological cover for class rule? 
Or does Marx's later celebration of the Paris Commune (CWF 181-207), as well as his conceptualization of 
communism, display continuity with his early celebration of democracy? The relation between Marx's early and 
late views–both in general, and specifically with regard to democracy–is a matter of scholarly controversy, on 
which this chapter takes no position. For various defences of a continuist interpretation with respect to 
democracy, see Avineri (1993: 34); Rubel (1962); Springborg (1984); Chrysis (2018); Coletti (1975: 43). 
6 For an overview, see Avineri (1993: 8-40); Depew (1992). 
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For Hegel, the rationality of the state is fundamental for the possibility of human freedom.  
[I]t is only through being a member of the state that the individual [Individuum] 
himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life. (PR §258 | 276) 
Why is this? A self whose objects of action are foreign and external cannot be properly free, 
because such a self is not purely self-determining. Instead, the self's action must 
accommodate to the features of those objects, contingent and foreign to it, or in other words, 
such a self is dependent on those objects. The self's freedom can only be secured if its objects 
can be incorporated into itself, and lose their character as other (PR §§22-23 | 53-54). If 
external forces can be understood as rational, then they lose their continency and foreignness. 
If Hegel achieves PR's goal of showing the state to be rational, then this rational insight 
allows “reconciliation with actuality” (PR Pref | 22). 
 
Does this mean that freedom is merely a question of having the correct frame of mind–can a 
sufficiently philosophical perspective achieve freedom equally in any concrete situation by 
thinking rationally enough about it? To the contrary, rationality needs to be actualized in the 
world in which the thinking self lives (PR §32 | 60, §153 | 196). Through history, human 
societies have developed increasingly rational forms (PR §342-4 | 372-3). With the 
emergence of the modern state, 
the momentous unification of self-sufficient individuality with universal substantiality 
takes place. (PR §33 ad. | 64) 
In Hegel's view, the modern state is the apex of the development of rationality because it 
uniquely accommodates both subjective freedom (private freedom or particularity) and 
objective freedom (public universality).7 In ancient Greece, citizens wholeheartedly identified 
with the public universality of their city. But not only did citizens lack the full subjective 
freedom to shape their lives individually: even worse, the city was dependent on a slave class 
to serve the sphere of human needs. The slaves, despite their evidently human self-
consciousness, were denied any reflection in the city's political form (PR §356 | 378-9). In the 
modern state, these limitations are overcome. Human needs are served through private 
activities of citizens, in what Hegel calls civil society. Within civil society everyone is 
granted the subjective freedom to pursue a diversity of individual ends. At the same time, 
modern state does not mistake the subjective freedom of civil society for freedom tout court. 
Citizens' private subjective freedom achieves its full objectivity through their public role in 
universality of the state (PR §260 | 282-3). 
 
Hegel defends a fairly detailed institutional model for the rational modern state, through 
which the subjective particularity of civil society can be brought together with the objective 
universality of the state. Without some structured mediation, civil society risks degenerating 
into an amorphous rabble of particular needs and desires. Hegel proposes that individuals in 
civil society should find their roles as members of family units but also more significantly as 
members of estates (the agricultural estate, the estate of trade and industry). These 
intermediary bodies are then coordinated by the actions of the civil service or bureaucracy as 
the universal estate (PR §199-208 | 233-9, §250-6 | 270-4). Finally, the whole social order is 
crowned with a monarch as a head of state. For only the single person of the monarch can 
provide the complex whole of the state with the unity and will necessary to act (PR §279 | 
316-7). 
 
I now turn to sketch Marx's theory of democracy, as it emerges in his response to Hegel's 
political philosophy. Marx's general complaint is that Hegel identifies ideas or rationality as 
 
7 For this distinction, see PR §26 | 55-57. 
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the subject of history and politics, reducing empirical contents of actual human lives to mere 
predicates of this cosmic subject.  
The mystical substance becomes the real subject and the real subject appears to be 
something else, namely a moment of the mystical substance. (CHPR 24, re: PR §279) 
For throughout the PR, Hegel does not merely identify the state as rational. More robustly, 
Hegel attributes agency and will to rationality itself, or in Hegelian jargon, to spirit, or the 
Idea. Then the state as a rational entity becomes the vehicle of the Idea's subjecthood. 
The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea – the ethical spirit as substantial will, 
manifest and clear to itself, which thinks and knows itself and implements what it 
knows in so far as it knows it. (PR §257 | 275) 
In Marx's view, Hegel's analysis is upside down. 
The real point of departure, the self-knowing and self-willing mind, without which the 
end of the state and the powers of the state would be illusions devoid of principle or 
support, inessential and even impossible existents, appear to be only the final 
predicate of substantiality, which had itself previously been defined as the universal 
end and as the various powers of the state. (CHPR 17, re: PR §269) 
It is the real material contents, actual human lives, which are truly subject, and the ideas as 
predicate. Marx still conceives a “true” social order in terms of the Hegelian demand for a 
self-knowing will, but now one where the people as a material force are the subject. The 
subject, always the people, avoids abstraction when it transparently and self-consciously acts, 
rather than having its action mystified or distorted. Let's see how this bears on the question of 
democracy. 
 
1. Democracy as the truth of all regimes. Marx's core discussion of democracy comes as an 
extended response to PR §279 (CHPR 23-33). To Hegel's claim that the state must be 
monarchical, Marx offers this pithy chiasmus: 
Democracy is the truth of monarchy, monarchy is not the truth of democracy. (CHPR 
29, re: PR §279) 
Or less compactly, 
Democracy is the generic constitution; monarchy is a species, and indeed a poor one. 
[...] Democracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions. Here the constitution not 
only in itself, according to essence, but according to existence and actuality is 
returned to its real ground, actual man, the actual people, and established as its own 
work. The constitution appears as what it is, the free product of men (CHPR 29-30, 
re: PR §279) 
Hegel poses monarchy as the proper constitutional vehicle of the subject, due to its inherent 
unity of will. But from Marx's point of view, the constitution is actually a free product of 
human action. Consequently, its real subject is the people, and a true social order is one in 
which this subject, the people, acts self-consciously and transparently. 
[A]ll forms of the state have democracy as their truth, and for that reason are false to 
the extent they are not democracy (CHPR 31, re: PR §279) 
Political orders such as monarchy that obscure or mystify the true subject are perniciously 
abstract. 
 
2. True democracy against the state. Marx's claim that the social order is the free product of 
“actual man, the actual people”, and that correspondingly democracy is the unalienated 
political form, in fact has two separable steps. First, democracy as a state form, or what Marx 
sometimes labels “the republic” (CHPR 31, re: PR §279), overcomes the abstraction of a 
monarchical state form. But second and more distinctively, democracy beyond the state form, 
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or what Marx sometimes calls “true democracy,” overcomes the abstraction of all regimes 
that still feature the state. 
In democracy the abstract state has ceased to be the governing moment. The struggle 
between monarchy and republic is itself still a struggle within the abstract form of the 
state. The political republic [–that is, the republic merely as a political constitution–] 
is democracy within the abstract form of the state. Hence the abstract state-form of 
democracy is the republic; but here [in true democracy] it ceases to be mere political 
constitution. (CHPR 31, re: PR §279) 
What is this pernicious abstractness of the state? Marx observes that equally in a monarchy or 
in a republic, there is still the distinction (so celebrated by Hegel) between public and private. 
In monarchy for example, [or] in the republic as merely a particular form of the state, 
political man has his particular and separate existence beside the unpolitical, private 
man. (CHPR 30, re: PR §279) 
Marx accedes to Hegel's idea that the existence of a political sphere as against a sphere of 
civil society is the essence of the state, but differs on its normative significance. For Hegel, 
the individual of civil society, living within their family and community, may have their 
subjective freedom, but this subjective freedom remains abstract. It is only through 
membership in the state that objective freedom is achieved. For Marx, again Hegel's analysis 
is upside down. The individual in these social forms of civil society is at their most concrete; 
it is the state that is the abstraction, and an unnecessary one at that (CHPR 27, re: PR §279). 
It is humans in their real material lives in civil society who act, and if they find their political 
status only apart from civil society, then they are alienated. The challenge is to achieve the 
universality promised by the political state, but within civil society: this will be called true 
democracy (CHPR 30f., re: PR §279).8 
 
3. Democracy and irreligion. CHPR endorses an analogy between political abstraction and 
Feuerbachian religious alienation. 
Just as it is not religion that creates man but man who creates religion, so it is not the 
constitution that creates the people but the people which creates the constitution. 
(CHPR 30, re: PR§279) 
Just as Christianity projects human needs more authentically than other religions, so too the 
democratic state form projects human needs more authentically than other state forms. But 
neither is Christianity a solution to religious alienation, nor is the republic a solution to 
political abstraction. True democracy is to politics what atheism is to religion (CHPR 30, re: 
PR §279; see also Avineri 1993: 10-12). More strongly, in the famous “Contribution to the 
Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right”: Introduction” (composed in 1844 and originally 
intended as an introduction to a revised CHPR), Marx proposes that political alienation and 
religious alienation are not merely analogous phenomena, but are actually intertwined. 
This state, this society, produce religion, which is an inverted world-consciousness, 
because they are an inverted world. ... Thus, the struggle against religion is indirectly 
the struggle against that world of which religion is the spiritual aroma. (CHPR 131) 
That is, in true democracy there would no longer be any religion; religion is a manifestation 
of more prosaic political forms of alienation, and both promise to be overcome together. 
 
 
8 How the distinction between private individual and political subject will be overcome remains unclear in 
CHPR. In Marx's later works, it depends on a transformation of the mode of production and a corresponding 
elimination of class distinctions. In CHPR, Marx suggests that the struggle for universal suffrage may already 
achieve true democracy (CHPR 121, re: PR §308; see also CHPR 118, re: PR §308), but this is hard to reconcile 
with his criticisms of the democratic state throughout the rest of the text. For discussion, see Springborg (1984: 
538, 545), Coletti (1975: 43-44). 
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Marx on Spinoza on Democracy 
Readers of Marx and Spinoza have enthusiastically identified a direct connection between the 
two philosophers' respective conceptions of democracy.9 Rubel (1962: 81) is representative: 
One would not go wrong in asserting that Marx's criticism of Hegel is no more than a 
poetical and satirical transposition of Spinoza's detached pleadings for the best form 
of government, namely democracy. 
Indeed, there is considerable prima facie plausibility for understanding Marx's democracy as 
Spinozist. Evidencing Marx's close attention to Spinoza's work, in his 1841 student notebook 
of selections Marx transcribed 16 pages of selections from Spinoza's TTP in his own hand.10 
Nor was this a mere unthinking transcription. The notebook selections are systematically 
reordered (as I will discuss in the following section). Indeed, Marx appeared to feel credit 
was due for the intellectual effort of this reordering: below the notebook's title, “Spinoza's 
Theological Political Treatise”, Marx added “by Karl Heinrich Marx”. Granted, at that time 
Marx was not primarily thinking about democracy, instead focusing on religion and its place 
in politics.11 Marx's selection of fragments from the TTP does not even systematically seek 
out passages on democracy. Nonetheless, Spinoza's concern for religion is intertwined with 
his broader discussion of politics. Insofar as what emerges from Marx's selections 
foreshadows the three elements of his own subsequent discussion of democracy in CHPR, we 
can say that Spinoza was a historical influence on Marx’s early theory of democracy. 
 
1. Foreshadowing Marx's idea that democracy is the truth of all regimes, Spinoza appears to 
hold democracy to be the most natural of all regimes. Marx transcribes TTP's account of the 
formation of social order, which proceeds through horizontal combination, and which directly 
produces democracy. 
[I]f we consider that without mutual aid men must live most wretchedly and without 
any cultivation of reason, we shall see very clearly that to live, not only securely, but 
very well, men had to agree in having one purpose. So they brought it about that they 
would have collectively the natural right each one had to all things. It would no 
longer be determined according to the force and appetite of each one, but according 
to the power and will of everyone together. (MTTP §71; TTP 16.13. Marx's emphasis) 
[E]ach person transfers all the power he has to the social order, which alone will 
retain the supreme right of nature over all things. ... The right of such a social order is 
called Democracy. This is defined, then, as a general assembly of men which has, as a 
body, the supreme right over everything in its power. (MTTP §73; TTP 16.25) 
The final sentence of Marx's selections from Spinoza's discussion of the state's internal 
structure draws a very explicit conclusion regarding the status of democracy: 
[... The democratic state] seemed to me to be the most natural state, and the one which 
approached most nearly the freedom nature concedes to everyone. (MTTP §75; TTP 
16.33) 
 
2. Spinoza does speak of the political order as a republic (respublica) which is a state 
(imperium) headed by a sovereign (summa potestas) who exercises a right to rule (ius 
imperandi). But in Spinoza's usage, these terms are redefined to eliminate juridical 
abstraction. Foreshadowing Marx's defence of true democracy, as opposed to the republic 
 
9 See footnote 3, above. 
10 Selections from Spinoza’s correspondence, as well as a title page and a table of contents for the TTP excerpts, 
are in the hand of a copyist. All excerpts and selections were taken from first volume of the 1802-3 Paulus 
edition of Spinoza’s works. (Rubel 1977: 12-14).  
11 For a discussion of the place of the 1841 Spinoza notebooks within Marx's philosophical development, see 
Bianchi (2018); Rubel (1977). 
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(democracy as a state form), Spinoza famously refuses any conception of right outstripping 
power (potentia), and uses an analysis of politics through real concrete powers of the people 
to diminish the claims of the sovereign or the state to authority. As Marx transcribes: 
Now the supreme law of nature is that each thing strives to persevere in its state [in 
suo statu], as far as it can by its own power [quantum in se est], and does this, not on 
account of anything else, but only of itself. From this it follows that each individual 
has the supreme right to do this, i.e. [...] to exist and have effects as it is naturally 
determined to do. (MTTP §69; TTP 16.3) 
The natural right [jus ... naturale] of each man is determined not by sound reason, but 
by desire and power [potentia]. (MTTP §70; TTP 16.7) 
As a corollary, covenants and contracts–including the contract founding the state–have no 
force of their own, except insofar as they are continually endorsed by the contractors. Marx 
transcribes: 
From these considerations we conclude that a contract can have no force except by 
reason of its utility. If the utility is taken away, the contract is taken away with it, and 
remains null and void. (MTTP §72; TTP 16.20) 
In consequence, state authority has no power or right beyond its popular support, and a ruler 
without real power will not endure. Marx transcribes: 
For as we've shown, this right of commanding [ius ... imperandi] whatever they wish 
belongs to the supreme 'powers [summis potestatibus] only so long as they really have 
the supreme 'power [quamdiu revera habent summam potestatem]. If they should lose 
[that 'power], they also lose, at the same time, the right of commanding all things. 
(MTTP §74; TTP 16.28) 
Finally, the good democratic state is characterized as a democracy maintaining uncoerced and 
wholehearted freedom. Marx transcribes: 
[I]n a Republic, and a state where the supreme law is the well-being of the whole 
people, not that of the ruler, someone who obeys the supreme power in everything 
should not be called a slave, useless to himself, but a subject. So that Republic is most 
free whose laws are founded on sound reason. For there each person, when he wishes, 
can be free, i.e. live wholeheartedly according to the guidance of reason. [... The 
democratic state] seemed to me to be the most natural state, and the one which 
approached most nearly the freedom nature concedes to everyone. (MTTP §75; TTP 
16.33) 
 
3. Foreshadowing Marx's intertwining of religious and political alienation, Marx's selections 
from Chapter 20 set up a binary contrast between the free regime which allows all to think as 
they please, and the violent regime which attempts to enforce doctrine, particularly religious 
doctrine. The free regime allows nobility to flourish, whereas the violent regime encourages 
servility (MTTP §§36-44; see also TTP 20.39). Spinoza views the drive to impose religious 
doctrine as a concealed powerplay (MTTP §45; TTP 20.45). In ancient times, when tyrants 
and despots feared the people, they would render them docile through religious mystification. 
Marx transcribes: 
[W]hen Kings assumed the rule in earlier times, to make themselves secure they tried 
to persuade people that they were descended from the immortal Gods. They thought 
that if only their subjects (and everyone else) didn't look on them as equals, but 
believed them to be Gods, they would easily surrender to them, and willingly submit 
to their rule. (MTTP §56; TTP 17.20) 
Without a credulous population, a less crude approach is necessary, but the same basic 
strategy is in play. Rulers seek to persuade their subjects not that they are Gods, but that they 
are God's representative on earth (MTTP §57; TTP 17.24). 
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Questioning Marx's Spinoza 
Matheron (1977: 160) claims that Marx's 1841 notebook amounts to a “real montage” of 
Spinoza's text. Matheron meticulously examines Marx's 170 textual fragments of TTP, and 
finds that Marx's selection and reordering alter the logical and conceptual relations between 
Spinoza's ideas. In result, Matheron argues that Marx's notebook presents a different 
philosophical view compared to Spinoza's own (Matheron 1977: 161). 
 
Specifically, Matheron's classic analysis undermines the Spinozist credentials of the third 
element I distinguish in Marx's thinking of democracy: the neat distinction between free and 
freethinking democratic regimes and unfree, undemocratic, superstitious regimes. Matheron 
shows that Marx’s selections systematically leave out and obscure central themes of the TTP: 
the permanent imaginative mooring of social life, and the potentially positive role of religion 
(Matheron 1977: 159-60, 169-73). Unquestionably, Spinoza is concerned with the problem of 
superstitious capture of political power by despots and tyrants, and the TTP's core purpose is 
to oppose sectarian attempts to legislate religion. But for Spinoza, the problem is with certain 
modes of theologico-politics, not with religion itself. Far from religion being antithetical to a 
free democratic regime, for Spinoza religion plays a positive role in facilitating commitment 
to and action for the common good. By contrast, Marx correlates religion with political 
servitude, and reads TTP wilfully to accord with that prior view.12 Even though Marx drew 
on Spinoza’s texts, what he took from them was theoretically at odds with Spinoza’s own 
view. 
 
My own analysis will focus on the second element that I distinguish in Marx’s thinking of 
democracy: true democracy as opposed to the state. Does Spinoza’s philosophy actually 
substantively support true democracy, or is the apparent support a mere artefact of MTTP’s 
selective sampling? I explore this question through a reading of Spinoza’s political texts–not 
only the full TTP, but also the TP–and through a reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics in E.13 I 
find that the support is merely apparent. For Spinoza, there is no privileged subject of social 
life needing to be returned to itself from the clutches of an abstract and alienating state. To 
the contrary, for Spinoza the state and its people are intertwined results of concrete processes, 
nor does the state have less reality than its people. 
 
Questioning Marx's Spinoza–The Political Texts 
In fact, the state is very present in Spinoza’s political philosophy. Marx gives the impression 
that subjects in Spinoza's democracy are bound to abide by the rule of the state only when it 
is useful to them, echoing Marx's own idea of true democracy where the people's action is 
unalienated and unimpeded by a state (MTTP §72, TTP 16.20). But in adjacent discussions, 
Spinoza emphasizes the constraint that a social contract produces. Linking one's compliance 
with a contract to its “utility” does not translate into a freedom to exit the state when one 
chooses. For once the state as a union of subjects has been concretely achieved, it has 
overwhelming power compared to any of its particular individual subjects. In this situation, it 
is extremely useful to keep one's promise to comply. Once the state exists, subjects who are 
 
12 A similar observation is found in Igoin (1977); Dobbs-Weinstein (2014); and Morfino (2013: 192-4). 
13 The TP is contained (along with the Ethics) in the second volume of the 1802-3 Paulus edition of Spinoza’s 
works, whereas Marx’s notebooks transcribe material only from the first volume. Marx probably had access to 
the second volume, since his dissertation and preparatory notes quote from the Ethics (Matysik 2021: 41). 
Nonetheless, there is no positive evidence he read the TP. Perhaps at the time of Marx's 1841 notetaking, with 
his interests focused on religion and politics, he saw little reason to dwell on the TP, in which the treatment of 
religion is minimal compared to the TTP. 
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not mad or foolhardy cannot individually abandon their promise of obedience without 
forseeable overwhelmingly negative results (TTP 16.27, see also TTP 5.22; Matheron 1977: 
176-88). In consequence, contrary to MTTP's suggestion, there is no effective right to 
abandon one's promise, unless and until a critical mass of co-dissenters has been formed. 
 
Spinoza's comfort with the state's constraint on the individual can be readily understood in 
light of the broader commitments of his political philosophy. For Spinoza, human behaviour 
needs to be understood through its determinate causes, the most significant such cause being 
the political institutions (broadly conceived) under which we live. Political institutions 
produce their individual subjects, in part negatively (by constraint), but also more 
significantly in positive ways (by cultivating affects and dispositions and structuring 
behaviours). This is deeply incongruous with respect to Marx's view of political institutions 
as external and secondary to the “actual people” who are the true subjects of social life. I'll 
establish Spinoza's view through attention to two key sets of textual evidence: the TTP's 
treatment of the Hebrew Republic, and the TP's republican conception of virtue. 
 
Spinoza's discussion of the Hebrew Republic takes up the bulk of TTP's Chapter 17. 
Matheron (1977: 187-97) has shown that Marx misrepresents the Republic as a uniformly 
oppressive superstitious state (MTTP 56-66), whereas in fact Spinoza distinguishes various 
phases of its existence, including one phase in which it is presented in a positive light. But 
what is the lesson of this positive phase? Spinoza makes explicit that achieving a stable state, 
not torn apart by internal conflict, is a general challenge all societies, and not (contra the 
suggestion of Marx's fragments) only for tyrannical regimes. For humans have deep-rooted 
tendencies to antisocial behaviour: 
All men, whether they rule or are ruled, tend to prefer pleasure to difficult work. 
Those who've experienced how changeable the mentality of the multitude is almost 
despair about it. They're governed only by the affects, not by reason. Rushing 
headlong toward everything, they're easily corrupted either by greed or by extravagant 
living. Everyone thinks that he alone knows everything, and wants everything to be 
done according to his mentality. ... From envy for the greater praise or better fortune 
someone else receives–these things are never equal–he wishes the other person ill, 
and is delighted when bad things happen to him. ... Everyone knows how it goes–a 
disgust for the present, a craving to make fundamental changes, uncontrolled anger, a 
scorn for poverty–these affects lead men to wickedness. [… T]o establish the state 
[imperium] so that there's no place for fraud–to establish things so that everyone, 
whatever his mentality, prefers the public right [ius publicum] to private advantage 
[privatis commodis], this is the task, this is our concern (TTP 17.14-16)14  
It is a challenge to establish good conduct, and the positive phase of the Hebrew Republic–
the theocratic phase after Moses's death–offers a case study in how this challenge might 
valuably be met. 
 
Spinoza provides a detailed account of the institutional order of the Hebrew state after 
Moses's death. Centrally, it was organized around a division of powers between those 
interpreting God's law and those implementing it, with neither party superior to the other, 
meaning that no one held all the functions of supreme commander; Spinoza also discusses 
questions of the number of tribes, the rights of succession, and the allocation of roles and 
functions (TTP 17.41-61). Spinoza then explains how the manifold pressures and incentives 
of this institutional order generated the required behaviour in all parts of the society (TTP 
 
14 Marx reproduces only the final sentence (MTTP §55). 
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17.62). On the side of the rulers, certain functional divisions prevented usurpation and 
corrupt rule, supported by the vigilance and piety of the population in scrutinizing their 
actions. On the side of the ruled, their good conduct, both in keeping their rulers in line and in 
acting sociably themselves, is understood by Spinoza to emerge from a nexus of causes: 
solidarity and love of country arising from shared worship; hostility to foreigners (and no 
temptation to defect) due to religious difference; the jubilee regularly overturning emergent 
inequality and eliminating alienation from real property; poverty being bearable due to the 
lack of inequality; a detailed ritual organization of the activities of everyday life; and even a 
ritual organization of life's greatest joys and pleasures, through regular festival days (TTP 
17.76-92). In Morfino's (2013: 196) words, “the people are not alienated in the Jewish state; 
they are constituted in it as such.”15 
 
A Marxian reader might be skeptical whether any broader lesson can be drawn from the 
Hebrew example. Could it be the case that this ancient religious state only required 
institutional complexity precisely because, qua religious, it was an alienated state, obscuring 
its own true subject? To the contrary, Spinoza's institutionalist commitment is perfectly 
general. In TP, Spinoza again defines his task as exploring the determinate causes of good or 
bad behaviour: 
I've contemplated human affects–like love, hate, anger, envy, love of esteem, 
compassion, and other emotions–not as vices of human nature, but as properties 
which pertain to it in the same way heat, cold, storms, thunder, etc., pertain to the 
nature of the air. Though these things are inconvenient, they're still necessary, and 
have definite causes, through which we strive to understand their nature. (TP 1.4) 
And again, the most significant causes of human behaviour are the state within which they 
live: 
But just as the subjects’ vices and their excessive licence and stubbornness, are to be 
imputed to the Commonwealth [Civitati], so, on the other hand, their virtue and 
constant observance of the laws are to be attributed most to the virtue of the 
Commonwealth and its absolute right. (TP 5.3)  
This general framework for political analysis is then applied in TP Chapters 6-11 
successively to monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic regime forms. There is no proper 
discussion of democracy because Chapter 11 was incomplete at Spinoza's death, but in 
theorizing monarchy and aristocracy, Spinoza discusses every variety of institutional pressure 
or effect. He offers a detailed consideration of: the formation of assemblies, including 
principles of membership, rotation, and term limits; checking bodies (the Syndics); regimes 
of real property; forms of military recruitment; procedures for selecting ministers and judges 
and structures to ensure that they do their jobs well; geographical features (especially the 
distribution of cities); the pros and cons of sumptuary laws and of public honours. The result 
is similarly, if not more, institutionally complex than the Hebrew Republic. 
 
These discussions add up to show that the challenge, within Spinoza's philosophy, is not for 
politico-legal forms to map onto some underlying natural order, but instead to constitute a 
good political order, and the good subjects within it. Marx insists that “[m]an does not exist 
because of the law but rather the law exists for the good of man” (CHPR 30, re: PR §279). By 
contrast for Spinoza, there is a meaningful sense in which both sides of the chiasm must be 
affirmed: law does exist for the good of man, but at the same time, man also does exist 
because of the law. What drops out on this account is the Marxian preoccupation with 
identifying a true subject. Spinoza's philosophy is anti-subjective in the sense that social 
 
15 See also Matheron 1977: 192-3. 
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order is not conceived as an edifice that can either transparently or obscurely express its true 
subject's action. To the contrary, the theoretical focus is on the difficult ongoing construction 
of coherent individual and collective action out of the messy materials of social life, without 
appeal to a subject. If this coherence is achieved at all, it is achieved through a dense web of 
processes and micropowers (Morfino 2013: 196). Such a social order is certainly a human 
product, but it is not a Marxian “free product of men”, nor does it have “actual man, actual 
people” as its subject (CHPR 29f., re: PR §279). 
 
Questioning Marx's Spinoza–Spinoza's Metaphysics 
It may be puzzling how I can put forward this heavily institutional reading of Spinoza, 
despite earlier noting his anti-juridical reduction of right to power (MTTP §§69, 70, 72, 74). 
For that reduction had appeared to grant greater reality to actual people, as bearers of power, 
and lesser reality to political institutions, as a mere effect of the actual people's power. 
Political institutions may pretend to have their reality in some independent possession of 
juridical right, but in fact (so the passages appeared to indicate) they are dependent for their 
continued existence their ongoing channelling of the people's power. Such an understanding 
appear to be strongly corroborated by the later TP's invocations of the power of the multitude 
[potentia multitudinis]: 
This right, which is defined by the power of the multitude, is usually called 
sovereignty. (TP 2.17) 
[T]he right of the commonwealth is determined by the power of a multitude which is 
led as if by one mind. (TP 3.7) 
These passages assert that the state (sovereignty, the commonwealth) relies on the power of 
the popular multitude for its reality. This suggests, first, that there is such a thing as the 
multitude's power, an originary horizontal plane of individuals separate from the state. 
Second, it also suggests that the most powerful state is one which flattens onto the multitude, 
and in so doing eliminates itself as such. Indeed, Negri (1998) has argued that while 
institutional complexity may well be necessary for maintaining an alienated political order 
(not only the Hebrew Republic, but also the non-democratic regimes in TP), by contrast had 
Spinoza completed the TP, he would have theorized democracy as self-founding, and any 
necessary institutions would emanate from the multitude as such.16 
 
I'll now demonstrate that the mismatch between the institutional reading that I have sketched 
and Spinoza's anti-juridicism is merely apparent. For the prima facie Marxian implications of 
Spinoza's “power of the multitude” do not hold up to analysis. Marx appears to take the view 
that real power lies in natural things like humans, whereas human political constructions like 
the state only have derivative power. But this intuition is not shared within Spinoza's 
metaphysics, which is ontologically permissive regarding both its definition of individuality 
and its attribution of powers.17 An individual is nothing other than a complex aggregation of 
parts displaying a characteristic pattern of motions (E 2p13Def, 2p13L4-L6 | G II, 99-101). 
Suppose a state exists as a concrete arrangement of components (its members, the multitude) 
with certain regular patterns of interaction amongst them. Then such a state counts as an 
individual (TP 4.4-5). To be sure, the state's components are human beings, but those human 
beings themselves are just complex aggregates of parts (E 2p13PostI | G II, 102). There is no 
Marxian separation between “true” actual humans and the “illusion” of the state, nor anything 
more deeply real about the former compared to the latter.18 The multitude and the state are 
simply the same entity under different perspectives, or in other words, as Balibar insists, for 
 
16 For an in-depth critique of Negri's view, see Field (2012). 
17 The remainder of this section draws heavily on Field (2020b: Chapters 7 & 8). 
18 This has been a point of interpretive controversy. For an overview, see Steinberg (2013).  
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Spinoza both ruler and ruled are part of the multitude (Balibar 1998: 70), and the state is an 
individual whether its regular patterns of motion are horizontally or hierarchically structured. 
In result, the claim that the right of sovereignty–or the right of the commonwealth–is the 
power of the multitude is just an analytical claim about any political regime whatsoever. The 
point of Spinoza's reduction of right to power is to deny that a state gains reality by the bare 
fact of covenant or assertion of right, and to redirect our attention to the concrete reordering 
and recombining of individual powers. If there is a covenant which results in a concrete 
recombination of powers, then the resultant state has power and is no illusion (Field 2020b: 
186-92). 
 
To be sure, Spinoza's philosophy does mark a distinction between more and less desirable 
political orders, mapping onto something like a distinction between more or less powerful 
multitudes (TP 3.7, 5.1). But this distinction is not Marx's between unalienated true 
democracy and the alienated state-form. To see this, let's consider Spinoza's understanding of 
power more directly. 
 
Within Spinoza's metaphysics, one core distinction is between a thing's own power–its power 
of acting (potentia agendi), or equivalently, its reality, perfection, and freedom–and the 
power of other things. For any effect that a thing produces, we can ask to what degree the 
effect was produced through its own power and to what degree it was caused by the power of 
another. An individual has greater power of acting to the extent it produces effects that can be 
understood through its own nature alone, whereas a thing has a lesser power of acting insofar 
as the effects that it produces are understood through its own nature only in combination with 
another (Field 2020b: 179-84; Matheron 1988: 11-24). Recall Spinoza's conception of 
individual natures in terms of characteristic motions. An individual with a greater power of 
acting will be one which produces effects understood through the characteristic motions that 
define its individuality. This amounts to maintaining those motions, regardless of external 
perturbations. Thus it is complex self-regulating wholes (homeostatic wholes) that count as 
having the highest active power. By contrast, if a thing fails to maintain its characteristic 
motions, or if a thing maintains its characteristic motions only through external supports, then 
to that extent it is understood through the power of other things, not its own active power (E 
2p13s, 4p38-9, 5p39; Matheron 1988: 43-51). 
 
To make this distinction more concrete, consider the core example of the Ethics: individual 
human beings. It is not the case that all humans are equal in power of acting, which they 
merely express differently. To the contrary, for Spinoza each human individual at each point 
in time has their own specific degree of active power, corresponding to their actually 
achieved degree of self-regulation. The person of a low degree of power of acting is either 
one who is swayed by the passions and is buffetted with the force of external events (for 
instance, an irascible or sentimental individual) (E 4p2-4p6), or one who relies on external 
support to maintain their course (for instance, a child) (TP 2.11): in either case, their action is 
understood more through the external force than through their own nature. The sage who has 
approached ethical freedom (E 4app I-VI) has a high degree of power, for they are able to 
retain their equanimity in the face of external events: their action is primarily understood 
through their own nature. This is a rare and hard-won achievement through lengthy practices 
of self-cultivation (TP 1.6; E 5p42s). 
 
Let me now apply this gauge of degrees of active power to politics (Field 2020b: 192-3, 196-
8). As outlined above, any state whatsoever has right and power insofar as it exists and 
produces effects, and this power is nothing other than the power of the multitude (the power 
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of the actually existing combination of all elements of the society). But Spinoza's value is on 
the state high in active power: in the language of TP, such a state not merely has right but 
also is in control of right, it is sui juris (TP 3.6). A multitude low in active power is either 
fractious, swayed by controversies, buffetted by natural events, scattershot in its policy; or 
dependent on external force to maintain its course. A multitude high in active power is a 
robustly self-regulating, self-stabilizing order (TTP 20.7; TP 1.6). In particular, it will 
produce in its individual members the attitudes and behaviours which conduce to its own 
continuation (TP 4.4, 7.1-2, 10.9; Matheron 1988: 460). The political challenge is to increase 
the multitude's active power, and Spinoza's discussions throughout TP Chapter 6-11 explain 
the institutional measures which might be deployed to this end. Just as with the sage's self-
control, the multitude's robustness is an achievement rather than an underlying tendency. In 
sum, even the power of the multitude is not some prior force, but an institutional result. 
 
Questioning Marx's Spinoza–Political Freedom 
It may be puzzling how I can put forward a heavily institutional reading of Spinoza in the 
face of TTP’s direct endorsement of natural freedom. 
[... The democratic state] seemed to me to be the most natural state, and the one which 
approached most nearly the freedom nature concedes to everyone. (MTTP §75; TTP 
16.33; see also TTP 20.38) 
Now I will consider the place of natural freedom in a systematic account of Spinoza’s 
political philosophy. 
 
In reading Spinoza, a distinction can be made between ethical and political freedom. 
Spinoza's sage, achieving adequate knowledge of nature, has ethical freedom. However, this 
freedom can only be achieved by very few, at the end of a long life of self-cultivation. When 
Spinoza discusses freedom in a political context, he clearly is speaking of something more 
widespread. But in the TTP various alternative understandings of political freedom jostle 
together, leaving the impression of theoretical bricolage and experimentation.19 On the one 
hand, the passage cited above and its continuation fit neatly with Marx's idea of “true 
democracy”, appealing to a proper human condition of freedom, equality, and untransferred 
right. But on the other hand, elsewhere in TTP political freedom is said to lie in citizens being 
more hopeful than fearful, as well as retaining the possibility of ethical development towards 
the fuller ethical freedom. The end of the republic is to 
free each person from fear, so that he can live securely, as far as possible[. ...] The end 
of the Republic, I say, is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or 
automata, but to enable their minds and bodies to perform their functions safely, to 
enable them to use their reason freely, and not to clash with one another in hatred, 
anger or deception, or deal inequitably with one another. (TTP 20.11-12; see also TTP 
16.33-34) 
This second account of freedom is consistent with the institutional view of politics laid out in 
the previous section: for conceiving freedom in terms of degrees of hope and fear, freedom is 
itself an institutional product rather than a natural possession.  
 
Despite its prominence, the former account of political freedom should be viewed as an 
anomalous remnant of Spinoza's own political development. Spinoza starts his political 
discussions of TTP from within a directly Hobbesian vocabulary and framework. 
Specifically, he adopts Hobbes's starting point of natural freedom and equality of rights, and 
develops an internal critique of Hobbes's position from this starting point. But looking 
 
19 For a third distinct account of freedom, see (TTP 5.25). 
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beyond this polemical context, TTP’s “natural” freedom and equality is a juridical residue 
that makes little sense within the systematic Spinozist frame.20 Indeed, TP maintains the 
second notion of political freedom, whereby citizens act from hope and retain the possibility 
of ethical development (TP 5.4-6, 6.4), but very specifically drops the first. The 
corresponding passages in TP assiduously avoid mention of natural freedom, and directly 
deny the naturalness of untransferred right. Having asserted that right is coextensive with 
power (TP 2.1-8), Spinoza then makes a distinction between a person being in control of their 
right against being under the control of another. He then proceeds to sketch all the many 
ways in which individuals may come to fall in the latter category (TP 2.9-11). Spinoza 
concludes that prior to establishing the state, individuals cannot reliably avoid coming under 
the control of others–whether due to force, desire, or ignorance. Thus, far from the natural 
condition being one of non-transfer of natural right, to the contrary the state of nature is a 
condition of pervasive transfer of right (TP 2.15). 
 
Spinoza clearly requires any good regime to uphold political freedom. But what is the nature 
of this requirement? Is it intrinsic to the very idea of a secure (powerful and self-regulating) 
political order, or is it an additional stipulative requirement? To be sure, Spinoza thinks it 
difficult to achieve a powerful multitude without this freedom. He sometimes appears to 
reserve the designation sui juris only for free rational regimes (TTP Pref.12, 20.7; TP 3.7). 
But in other passages, he grants that it is not in principle impossible for there to be powerful 
slave regimes which achieve their self-regulation in a manner not respecting this freedom 
(TTP Pref.9-10; TP 5.4-7; 6.4). Thus, I take citizenly freedom not to be an intrinsic feature of 
secure powerful regimes, but rather a stipulative specification of the normatively appealing 
subset of secure regimes. 
 
In summary, Spinoza's distinction between good and bad political orders is not the Marxian 
distinction between regimes transparently manifesting the action of “the actual people” 
versus regimes of its institutional alienation. Rather, for Spinoza the differentiating criterion 
is a political order's degree of success in maintaining security and freedom. The big lesson of 
Spinoza's political philosophy is that constituting a good commonwealth is not a matter of 
revealing a true subject, but a task requiring structure and organization (TP 5.1-3). Certainly, 
institutions can be vehicles of oppression, capturing the political process to serve the interests 
of some at the expense of others. But it's one thing to critique certain forms of capture of 
political power, and another thing to establish what political power would look like if it were 
free. In political philosophy, Spinoza thus maintains at least one certain affinity with Hegel: 
freedom is achieved, if at all, through a complex and differentiated institutional order. In this 
respect, his democracy is fundamentally opposed to Marx's “true democracy”. 
 
Marx, Spinoza, Rousseau, and modernity 
To this point, I have considered the relation between Marxian and Spinozist democracy 
philosophically, in terms of their respective conceptions of the subject and power. I have 
argued that there is a significant sense in which CHPR's true democracy cannot be considered 
Spinozist. But it would be possible for Marx and Spinoza to disagree philosophically, but to 
agree at the level of social theory. For “the state”, in both Hegel and Marx's use, does not 
refer to the institutional form of just any social order. Rather, as both Hegel and Marx very 
explicitly and repeatedly insist, it refers to the political institutions of a social order in which 
 
20 A similar explanation can account for TTP's claim, not repeated in TP, that an oppressive regime does not 
truly have power (TTP 20.7). This claim fits with an idea of natural freedom of the people, but it sits oddly with 
Chapter 16's insistence that right is coextensive with power, including in cases of irrationality and self-
destructive behaviour; furthermore, it is unable to analyse oppressive regimes that somehow manage to survive.  
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the political sphere is separate from civil society (conceived as the private material sphere of 
everyday life). From the perspective of social theory, true democracy is not a social order 
without political institutions, but rather, a social order which overcomes this specific 
separation of spheres. What does Spinoza offer us regarding true democracy in this sense? 
 
In this section, I'll demonstrate that Spinoza's understanding of the state remains distinctly 
premodern. Certainly, Spinoza agrees the political regime needs to “match” the underlying 
material circumstances. But this requirement is taken for granted, and the possibility, so 
distinctive of capitalist modernity, of a pervasive mismatch between material circumstances 
and political status is not conceived. Hegel and Marx explain the systematic distinction 
between civil society and the state by a contrast to the historically prior, simple unitary 
hierarchy of medieval society. Spinoza's comfort, that so troubles commentators, with certain 
kinds of exclusion and hierarchy, can be understood as a product of his premodern mindset. 
 
Interest in the Spinozist filiation of Marx's early “true democracy” is driven in part by hopes 
to flesh out and defend an anti-statist conception of radical democracy. In particular, a 
Spinozist corroboration would appear to assist distinguishing true democracy from the statist 
conception of radical democracy found in Rousseau (Morfino 2013: 183-198). But 
notwithstanding his focus on the state form, Rousseau is in fact strongly aware of and 
explicitly committed to eliminating sociological gap between material life and the state. This 
feature of Rousseau’s thought is strongly present in Marx’s 1843 notebooks on SC, thus as a 
matter of influence, Rousseau is as significant as Spinoza for Marx developing his idea of 
true democracy. Furthermore, I'll argue substantively that Rousseau's thought supports 
Marx's idea of democracy as the truth of all regimes more robustly than Spinoza's. In sum, I'll 
argue that Marx's theory of democracy ultimately remains as much or more Rousseauvian 
than it is Spinozist. 
 
Recall that CHPR's theory of democracy involves two inversions of Hegel's defence of 
monarchy. The first inversion positions the state-form of democracy as primary, overcoming 
the greater alienation of other state-forms. But the second and more distinctive inversion 
positions true democracy as primary, overcoming the alienation of the republic (democracy 
as a mere state-form). Commentators grant that Rousseau stands as a powerful influence for 
Marx in theorizing the first inversion (Della Volpe 1979: 96-99; Isaac 1990: 485-6; Leopold 
2009: 74). Just as Marx asserts that “[d]emocracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions” 
(CHPR 29-30, re: PR §279), Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty is the foundation for 
all legitimate regimes. But Spinoza is alleged to offer Marx the framework for the second 
inversion. For far from critiquing the alienation involved in establishing the state-form, 
Rousseau appears to be its foremost proponent and champion. 
So, it is quite clear that if The Social Contract served as a model for Marx, it was not 
to think about democracy [... but] as a model for republics, conceived as the negation 
of monarchic alienation in the abstract sphere of the state, which nevertheless leave 
intact the contents of society (property, etc.) and the separation between public and 
private spheres. (Morfino 2013: 189) 
Evidence for this assertion lies not merely in Marx's careful notebook selection of passages 
from Rousseau's Social Contract discussing alienation (MSC 91.29-30, 92.26-28, 96.8-10; 
SC I.6.6, I.7.8, II.6.9), but also in Marx's later works, where Rousseau stands as the explicit 
point of reference for understanding the state form and the alienation it involves (Morfino 
2013: 196-7). By contrast, Marx’s selections from TTP emphasize the connection of right to 
power, the non-binding character of pacts, and the fragility and derivative character of state 
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power (MTTP §69, §72, §74). Spinoza's anti-juridicism is said to allow a movement beyond 
the formalism of the state. In Rubel's words: 
In Spinoza's views on democracy, Marx found what he could find neither in Hegel's 
political philosophy nor in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract, namely: the 
chance offered to the individual to reconcile social existence and natural life. (Rubel 
1962: 82) 
Regarding the idea of true democracy as a reappropriation of alienated human essence, 
Morfino asserts that “[t]here is no trace of democracy, understood in this sense, in Rousseau” 
(Morfino 2013: 188; Leopold 2009: 165). 
 
Nonetheless, Morfino and Rubel's refusal of a Rousseauvian source for Marx's anti-state 
conception of true democracy strikes me as too hasty. This becomes clear once we look at the 
real social formation which corresponds to Rousseau’s legitimate state. 
 
Earlier, I laid out briefly Marx's Hegelian understanding of the state. For both Marx and 
Hegel, the state is not a transhistorical fixture of human society. Rather, it is a historically 
specific phenomenon emerging in modernity, dividing the political domain from everyday 
material life in a historically unprecedented manner: 
It was most difficult to form the political state, the constitution, out of the various 
moments of the life of the people. It was developed as universal reason in opposition 
to the other spheres i.e., as something opposed to them. (CHPR 31, re: PR §279) 
Previously, private or material status immediately translated into political status. 
[I]n the Middle Ages property, trade, society, man was political ... In the Middle 
Ages, popular life and state [i.e., political] life were identical. Man was the actual 
principle of the state, but he was unfree man. It was therefore the democracy of 
unfreedom, accomplished alienation. (CHPR 32, re: PR §279) 
Marx's medieval “democracy of unfreedom” has, in common with his “true democracy”, an 
immediate connection between material life and political life. The medieval democracy of 
unfreedom is regrettable insofar as it  
separates man from his universal nature; it makes him an animal whose being 
coincides immediately with its determinate character. The Middle Ages constitutes 
the animal history of mankind, its zoology. (CHRP 82, re: PR §307) 
But the modern state form, achieving equal political status in a state notwithstanding the 
unequal concrete status of private individuals in a market economy, only falsely and 
abstractly achieves universality. Marx's challenge is to heal the rift between private and 
public, not by going back to the old medievalism, but by levelling up material life so that it 
achieves universality directly (CHPR 82, re: PR §307). 
 
In this light, Marx's true democracy can be understood not as a general and metaphysical 
anti-institutionalism, but rather, as an opposition to a very specific institutional division 
Leopold 2009: 260). Rousseau is sharply aware of this division, and fundamentally opposed 
to it (Coletti 1975: 33-46). Rousseau may be the classic theorist of juridical alienation to 
establish state sovereignty, but his central concern with this state sovereignty is how to bring 
people's actual material lives in line with their juridical roles. Rousseau recognizes the 
possibility of a state which purports to express the moral equality of citizens but in fact is a 
cover for economic inequality and oppression. Marx himself transcribes: 
Under bad governments this equality is only apparent only and illusory; it serves only 
to maintain the poor in his misery and the rich in his usurpation. In fact the laws are 
always useful to those who possess something and harmful to those who have 
nothing. (MSC 93.29-34; SC I.9 note; see also SC IV.1.5-6) 
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The legitimacy of the political order is threatened unless “no citizen be so very rich that he 
can buy another, and none so poor that he is compelled to sell himself” (SC II.11.2). 
Rousseau's theory of the state may prominently deploy the word “alienation,” but the 
concrete picture he draws of the good state is about as contrary to Marxian alienation as can 
be imagined: 
When, among the happiest people in the world, troops of peasants are seen attending 
to affairs of State underneath an oak and always acting wisely, can one help despising 
the refinements of other nations which make themselves illustrious and miserable 
with so much art and mystification? (SC IV.1.1) 
The commercial metropolises of London and Paris are Rousseau's paradigms of viciousness 
(SC IV.1.3). The difference between the good and the bad state lies in whether the citizens 
efficaciously identify as citizens and orient their lives to upholding the common good, or 
whether they pursue their own individual interests. Rousseau worries that “each individual 
may, as a man, have a particular will contrary to or different from the general will he has as a 
Citizen”. When individuals' private pursuits driven by their particular wills dominate, at the 
expense of the common purposes of the commonwealth, this tends towards the “ruin of the 
body politic” (SC I.7.7, see also MSC 96.25-37; SC II.7.3). 
 
Genuine popular sovereignty would require actual regular popular assemblies of the whole 
populace (reflecting citizens' moral equality), willingly attended by the whole citizenry, and 
in which the common good is upheld (SC III.13.1; MSC 9.323-27; SC I.9.8). By contrast 
with this image of genuine legitimate statehood, Rousseau is particularly vexed by the 
modern invention of political representation, which he views as the reflection of a failure to 
sustain a citizenry whose real material lives and passions concretely support the common 
good. For Rousseau, this is a pervasive problem: 
The cooling of the love of the fatherland, the activity of private interest, the 
immensity of States, conquests, the abuse of Government, have led people to imagine 
the expedient of Deputies or Representatives of the people in the nation's assemblies. 
[... But s]overeignty cannot be represented for the same reason it cannot be alienated 
[...] The idea of Representatives is modern (MSC 100.32-34, 100.38-39, 101.4, re: SC 
III.15.4, III.15.5, III.15.6, Marx's emphasis) 
The Rousseauvian state is dissolved as soon as the political order is no longer inhabited by 
real substantial popular sovereignty. 
[T]he moment the Government usurps the sovereignty, the social pact is broken, and 
all are ordinary Citizens, restored by right to their natural freedom, are forced to obey 
but not obligated to do so. (SC III.10.6, see also III.14.2) 
But this is a strange inversion: this usurpation of popular sovereignty by the government and 
private interests, which for Rousseau marks the dissolution of the state, sound very close to 
Marx's definition of the state. 
 
In sum, while Marx does appear exercised by Rousseau's characterization of the state as an 
abstraction and alienation from its subjects' natural condition, in fact Rousseau's solution to 
his own sharp differentiation between citizenly and natural status is to demand that citizens 
are concretely shaped to become citizenly. Rousseau's demand for alienation from 
naturalness amounts to a demand for efficaciously and continually achieving a new 
subjectivity amongst citizens. In particular, the required subjectivity is anti-commercial, 
economically egalitarian, and communal. When citizens immerse themselves in commercial 
affairs, or are made servile as a result of commerce, then Rousseauvian sovereignty vanishes, 
meaning that Rousseau's state cannot be abstract from civil society. These features of 
Rousseau’s view were all transcribed in Marx’s notebooks, and they appear in substantial 
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alignment with Marxian true democracy’s vision of the real concrete elimination of the 
distinction between private individual and political citizen.  
 
Turning now to Spinoza, I'll argue that Spinoza offers (in Marx's terms) a premodern view of 
the state. While a good Spinozist regime does align subjects' material lives with their political 
status, Spinoza does not conceive the possibility of a systematic gap between the two, and he 
is happy to resolve any gaps that may exist in the direction of inequality.21 
 
In the TP, Spinoza asserts that both monarchy and democracy are regimes grounded in the 
equality of citizens. Correspondingly, it is essential that the institutional order should 
maintain and reinforce this equality (TP 6.13-14, 7.20). I'll focus mostly on monarchy, due to 
the incompleteness of the discussion of democracy. Spinoza's primary concern is the risk of 
an emergent nobility. He wards off this possibility through both economic and political 
measures. All land and houses are the public property of the commonwealth, and are merely 
rented out to citizens (TP 6.12, 7.19). Nobility may only be bestowed on close relatives of the 
king, and those who are paid by the king are barred from taking up public office. Finally, the 
king acts only through a robustly equal popular assembly, structured to ensure representation 
across clans and classes, and involving such a high number and rapid rotation of councillors 
as to amount to a broad-based system of lot or sortition (TP 6.13-25, 7.4-5, 7.18; Field 2020b: 
255). 
 
This picture may sound well aligned to true democracy, giving reality to equal political status 
by assuring a thoroughgoing underlying equal material status. But in fact, in Marxian terms, 
it remains a premodern point of view. Marx's true democracy is a response and solution to the 
separation of the state as an entity distinct from civil society. What does it take for this 
separation to occur? 
It is obvious that the political constitution as such is perfected for the first time when 
the private spheres have attained independent existence. When commerce and 
property in land are not free, not yet autonomous, there is also not yet the political 
constitution. (CHPR 32, re: PR §279) 
In Spinoza's monarchy, one of its central features is state ownership of land. In other words, 
the state has not yet emerged as a point of universality out of from material life. 
Correspondingly, Spinoza's commitment to equality, although no doubt striking for his time, 
is not a modern universalist commitment. Marxian equality is conceived as a universal nature 
of human beings, to which their objective existence or determinate character must be brought 
to conform (CHPR 82, re: PR §307). Civil society must really and materially bring about the 
universal equality of citizens which the state only abstractly promises. By contrast, Spinoza 
presumes the need for a broad alignment of actual lives and abstract status, and tightens up 
this alignment where it is not quite right. But he straightforwardly accepts political inequality 
for those whose actual lives are distinctly unequal. Even in his regimes of equality, he affirms 
and upholds the inequality of women, servants, and those in servile professions (TP 6.11, 
11.3). The logic of this exclusion is clear: given that these people are enduringly materially 
and socially unequal, correspondingly they cannot count as equal citizens. I would 
characterize this feature of Spinoza's political philosophy not primarily as a moral blindspot 
that he could and should have overcome, but as a reflection of a premodern conceptual and 
sociological non-separation of state and civil society. 
 
 
21 While Francès’s classic (1951) paper demonstrates that the conception of the state in SC bears direct debt to 
TTP, it relies heavily on those passages that I have characterised above as anomalous juridical vestiges. 
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This premodern attitude is on display even more sharply in Spinoza's treatment of a virtuous 
aristocracy. In fact there is a hierarchy between patricians and commoners, with a broad 
equality amongst patricians, and this actual situation in the social world needs to be reflected 
and solidified in the political domain. Patricians are linked together with one another and 
distinguished from commoners in multiple ways: by patricians' training in the military arts 
and leadership in the military, against non-ranked commoners; by patricians' shared state 
religion, against commoner freedom of confession; by patricians' shared distinctive clothing. 
The patriciate's internal equality is politically enforced: attendance in the patrician assembly 
is compulsory and its internal selections are conducted by lot (TP 8.9, 8.27, 8.46, 8.47). A 
patrician's loss of their real social superiority above commoners, as when a patrician loses 
their wealth, needs to be matched by a loss of patrician status (TP 8.47). Spinoza muses on 
the concrete processes that may generate both the inequality between commoners and 
patricians and the commoners' acceptance of their status: he imagines a deep rural/urban 
divide, or histories of migration leading to variable feelings of political entitlement (TP 8.12). 
The well-ordered aristocratic regime then corroborates and supports commoners' acceptance 
of their status: the commoners own their own fields (TP 8.10), and therefore act from hope 
not fear, and they have more religious freedom than the patricians. Thus, the political and 
social inequality between commoners and patricians in no way jeopardizes the free and sui 
juris character of the virtuous aristocratic order. 
 
In sum, Marx conceives of a social order beyond the state in terms of the collapse of the 
distinction between civil society and the state, but he only endorses this collapse in its 
egalitarian form. Rousseau absolutely insists upon citizenly equality, nor does this insistence 
stand as mere abstraction: it is an explicit challenge to bring citizens materially in line with 
their formally equal status, on pain of the illegitimacy of the state. By contrast, for Spinoza, 
the need for a conformity between civil society and the political state does not have 
democratic implications. In cases where Spinoza sees some entrenched inequality within civil 
society, he does not hesitate to require the state structure to fit with that inequality. 
 
Marx views the genuine universalism of his true democracy as a possibility which arises only 
after the experience of the false universalism of the bourgeois state, within which individuals 
have universal equal status as citizens despite their inequality in their everyday material lives. 
Thus, the theoretical puzzle of the state (and its solution in true democracy) belong only to a 
period after Spinoza's death. To the extent Spinoza reflects on early commercial society, he 
has in mind merchants, not capitalists or industrialists, and he views commerce as a benign 
force (TP 7.8, 8.31; TTP 20.40). He is anti-commercial only as a question of personal ethics 
(seeking money for its own sake does not conduce to blessedness (E 4app XXIX)), not as a 
question of social structure. There is no inkling in Spinoza of the political phenomenon 
facing Marx in the mid-nineteenth century, by which 
the state power assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital 
over labour, of a public force organised for social enslavement, of an engine of class 
despotism (CWF 182) 
In principle one could apply Spinozist philosophical machinery to analyze the modern 
Marxian problem of the capitalist state. One could identify it as a slave regime, insofar as the 
proletariat comply not for sake of living but for fear of starving. As such, it would be a case 
of the peace of the Commonwealth “depend[ing] on its subjects' lack of spirit–so that they're 
led like sheep, and know only how to be slaves” (TP 5.4). In the capitalist state, the poverty 
and subjection of some sections of society is so grave as to threaten ethical development of 
the poor, and the dissonance between official equality and de facto inequality is perhaps 
sufficient to threaten the security of the regime. But the fact remains that in Spinoza's actual 
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writings, this analysis is not present, and there is no hint that modern political equality could 
coincide with slavery (Balibar 1993: 213). Spinoza does not in fact consider the distinction 
between civil society and politics, neither the benefits nor the problems that might follow 
from it. Rousseau, writing a century later, has more insight into the coming social order and 
its challenges. 
 
The bulk of my discussion has focused on Marx's “true democracy”. Now finally I turn to 
consider the third and apparently less controversial element of Marx's conception of 
democracy in CHPR: democracy as the truth of all regimes. This element surely was surely 
influenced by Marx’s reading of SC. For Rousseau, all legitimate regimes are popular, and 
the popular sovereign must regularly express its will in actual assemblies. It is often 
presumed that  Spinoza also unequivocally considers democracy to be the truth of all 
regimes. In MTTP's story of the foundation of the social order, democracy is presented as 
fundamental state form, and repeatedly described as most natural for intrinsic reasons. In light 
of my previous section's argument, it is necessary to reject the argument from naturalness as a 
juridical remnant in Spinoza's thought. But there appear to be other more Spinozist grounds 
for asserting that democracy is the truth of all regimes. I provided an account of Spinoza's 
criterion of a good regime as one achieving security (self-regulation), consistent with 
freedom (citizens acting from hope not fear, and retaining the possibility of ethical 
development). If this criterion is best met by democracy, then we can say that democracy is 
indeed the truth of all regimes. 
 
Whereas TTP offers various arguments suggesting that democratic regimes do best meet this 
criterion (TTP 5.23, 16.30, 20.38), TP is less confident of the merits of formally democratic 
regimes (TP 6.4), and it no longer positions democracy as the natural or primary state form 
(TP 2.11). But central to TP's analysis is the idea that the security of a regime depends on 
much more than its mere formal regime type. The question thus needs to be reformulated: is 
it the case that regimes which are substantially equal, inclusive, and responsive (regardless of 
their formal regime type) are the most secure and free? In this revised sense, is Spinoza 
committed to democracy as the truth of all regimes? It is common to answer in the 
affirmative (Balibar 1998: 33, 72-3; Matheron 1998: 213-17; Morfino 2013: 192). Balibar 
points out that for Spinoza in TP, a good monarchy amounts to a crypto-democracy. If a 
monarch attempts to rule alone, then they will find themself excessively dependent on 
advisors and also always at risk of praetorian usurpation, breeding paranoia and leading to 
oppressive rule and a restive populace (TP 6.5-7). The best monarchy will maintain citizen 
equality, and in particular it will be one organized around an inclusive and equal council, as 
described above. An aristocracy with few rulers will face the same problems that confronted 
a monarchy. The solution is to expand the membership of the patriciate indefinitely, such that 
a good aristocracy is again in reality a crypto-democracy (TP 8.3). 
 
I don't believe this argument is supported by the text. As I have argued at length elsewhere 
(Field 2020a), even though a good monarchy may amount to a crypto-democracy, a virtuous 
aristocracy specifically does not (TP 8.4-5). Spinoza envisages a patriciate of a moderate size 
(Spinoza suggests 5000 patricians for a state of a moderate size, amounting to 2% of the adult 
male population, TP 8.13) overcoming the problems that beleaguer very narrow patrician 
rule. But expanding inclusion, responsiveness, and equality to the commoners beyond this 
patriciate is destabilizing and undermines the state (TP 8.13). It may be that under many 
circumstances people hate being ruled by their equals (TP 7.5), but real material processes (as 
discussed above) sometimes constitute subjects accepting differential political status (TP 
8.12), without necessarily living in fear, and without any necessary impediment to their 
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Spinozist ethical development. When Spinoza asserts that “rule transferred to a sufficiently 
large [patrician] council is absolute, or comes nearest to being absolute” (TP 8.3), it is 
aristocracy as such that he is endorsing, not aristocracy as crypto-democracy. In result, I 
question whether Spinoza is committed to democracy as the truth of all regimes. 
 
Spinoza’s comfort with inequality marks a theoretical distinction between his democratic 
theory and Marx’s, both with regards to Marx's conception of “true democracy” and also to 
Marx's idea of “democracy as the truth of all regimes”. Thus, Marx's democratic theory has 
stronger theoretical affinities with the egalitarian Rousseau than with Spinoza, even if TTP’s 
discussion of the naturalness of democracy and his critique of right provided Marx inspiration 
in developing his own view. 
 
Conclusion 
Rousseau opens his Social Contract with a vehement rejection of any approach to politics 
which understands right in terms of force; such an approach can only result in an 
“unintelligible muddle” (SC I.3.2; see also SC I.1.2). For Rousseau, a view such as Spinoza's, 
attributing to big fish the right to eat the little ones (MTTP §68; TTP 16.2) commits a 
category mistake. Rousseau frames his task as offering a more robust moral frame for 
thinking about politics, centred on right as a moral legitimacy separate from power. 
 
This Rousseauvian criticism is no doubt crude when applied to Spinoza's political philosophy 
as a whole. For even though Spinoza's political philosophy starts by granting right to all 
actually existing regimes, as I have argued he does subsequently offer a framework for 
distinguishing between better and worse regimes, according to how secure and free they are. 
But Rousseau is astute in his worry that approaching politics from the point of view of power 
does not build in an intrinsic commitment to moral qualities such as freedom and political 
equality, unless there is some assurance that the power of the multitude is intrinsically free 
and equal. I suggested that the security–in the sense of self-maintaining, active power–of a 
regime is not intrinsically linked to the freedom of its subjects. Rather, Spinoza stipulatively 
requires that a good regime be free as well as secure. But even these regimes sui juris and 
free are not necessarily democratic, as illustrated by the case of virtuous aristocracy. Thus, 
for Spinoza to be a democrat, he would need an additional stipulation: only sanctioning 
regimes that are not only sui juris and free, but also equal.22 I simply don't see any such 
general stricture in TP. 
 
Marx transcribes the very passages in Spinoza on right and power that would appear to bother 
Rousseau (MTTP §68; TTP 16.2). But Marx's positive interest in these passages seems to 
connect with a presumption that the real greater power lies with the people conceived as a 
horizontal collection of equals, and not with the rulers. These people are the subject of social 
life, possessed of a power that may be obstructed, but which tends to express itself over time. 
In this way, Marx reads human ends into nature. By contrast, despite some humanist 
tendencies in TTP, overall Spinoza's view is jarringly antihumanist: 
For the perfection of things is to be judged by their nature and power; things are not 
more or less perfect because they please or offend men's senses, or because they are 
of use to, or are incompatible with, human nature. (E 1app | G II, 83); see also TTP 
16.10-11) 
For Spinoza, a good regime which is also free and democratic is not a natural tendency or 
development, but a challenge to be achieved. 
 
22 In my own neo-Spinozist theory of democracy, this is just what I have added (Field 2020b: 235-63). 
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In the end, Marx's theory of democracy was genuinely and significantly influenced by 
Spinoza, but this influence failed to transmit some core Spinozist conceptual commitments. It 
seems Marx's encounter with Spinoza lent generic encouragement to Marx in developing his 
own conception of democracy. But Marx's selections from TTP already painted a misleading 
picture of TTP's view of democracy, appearing even more incongruent in light of the later 
TP, let alone Spinoza's broader philosophical system. Nor does Spinoza display any 
particular insight into the historically emergent challenges that Marx's theory of true 
democracy grapples with. Thus, on the final analysis, Marx's conception of democracy must 
be sharply distinguished from Spinoza’s. 
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